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Why are “others” so polarized?  
Perceived political polarization and media use in 10 countries 
 
Abstract 
 
This study tests the associations between news media use and perceived political polarization, 
conceptualized as citizens’ beliefs about partisan divides among major political parties. Relying 
on representative surveys in Canada, Colombia, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, 
Norway, United Kingdom and United States, we test whether perceived polarization is related to 
the use of television news, newspaper, radio news, and online news media. Data show that online 
news consumption is systematically and consistently related to perceived polarization, but not to 
attitude polarization, understood as individual attitude extremity. In contrast, the relationships 
between traditional media use and perceived and attitude polarization is mostly country 
dependent. An explanation of these findings based on exemplification is proposed and tested in 
an experimental design.  
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Why are “others” so polarized?  
Perceived political polarization and media use in 10 countries 
The extent and causes of political polarization are recurring subjects of interest for academics 
and pundits alike. Discussions about levels of political polarization and the factors that may 
exacerbate this phenomenon abound (Carmines, Ensley, & Wagner, 2012; Fiorina & Abrams, 
2008: Prior, 2013). The role of the current media environment, and especially of exposure to 
biased information, in fostering political polarization has been of particular concern. Typically, 
two kinds of polarization have been studied in this context: attitude polarization, or the 
reinforcement of individuals’ prior views (e.g., Prior, 2013), and polarization on the aggregate 
level, such as increased distance in policy preferences between opposing partisans (Hetherington 
& Roush, 2013) or the dislike that those partisans feel toward each other (Garrett et al., 2014; 
Lelkes, Sood & Iyengar, 2015). Yet, researchers have only started to explore how news media 
shape people’s perception of polarization in the political system (Levendusky & Malhotra, 
2015), and this is the line of research to which we contribute.  
We seek to advance this research by considering whether people perceive political parties 
as drifting apart from each other and also whether different media use is related to such 
perceived polarization. Furthermore, we examine these relationships in a largely unexplored 
comparative perspective. More specifically, we consider the role of news media, in both 
traditional and online formats, in fostering perceived polarization. Our focus on traditional news 
media is due to the fact that, for most citizens in general and especially in non-Western countries, 
it is the television, radio and newspapers that are the main source of information about the 
political system (Papathanassopoulos et al., 2013). Germane to our focus on perceived 
polarization, traditional news tends to focus on conflict and disagreement (Fiorina, Abrams, & 
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Pope, 2005) and recent evidence suggests that press coverage showing the American electorate 
as polarized leads people to perceive partisan polarization in the mass public and also increases 
their dislike for opposing political parties (Levendusky & Malhotra, 2015).  
We are particularly interested in online news use and how it is comparable to traditional 
news media use when it comes to perceived polarization. The Internet offers citizens 
unprecedented access to nearly unlimited webpages, blogs, and online networks and allows 
people to select information that is consonant with their predispositions (Stroud, 2011). Thus, it 
is plausible that such online information presents the politicians or political parties that one 
personally dislikes as extreme, biased or otherwise incompetent, and/or focuses on political 
conflict to a greater extent than is the case in traditional media. As a result, online information 
seekers may perceive the political system as especially polarized (Smith, 2011). Furthermore, 
and germane to our comparative approach, different media systems operate under different 
journalistic values and norms. It is thus possible that the extent to which exposure to traditional 
or online news is related to perceived polarization may differ across various cultural and 
sociopolitical contexts. To shed light on whether this is indeed the case, we rely on 
representative surveys from ten countries. 
Our study does not explore potential effects of perceived polarization. Yet the growing 
scholarly focus on this phenomenon is motivated by the recognition that perceptions in general 
have very real consequences for individual’s attitudes, cognitions, and behaviors (e.g., Noelle-
Neumann, 1974; Gunther & Storey, 2000; Wojcieszak & Price, 2012). This is also the case for 
perceived polarization (see Ahler, 2014; Westfall, Van Boven, Chambers, & Judd, 2014). As 
research on pluralistic ignorance suggests, people’s erroneous belief about group opinion can 
affect own attitude (Prentice & Miller, 1993). When people think that the mass electorate and the 
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political parties are polarized, they may adopt more extreme policy preferences (Ahler, 2014) 
because people adopt perceived social norms of reference groups to affirm their sociopolitical 
identity that stems from one’s group memberships (Katz, 1960). 
In the sections that follow, we (1) briefly outline extant conceptualizations of 
polarization; (2) propose a measure of perceived polarization; (3) examine the factors associated 
with perceived polarization in 10 countries, paying particular attention to online news vis-à-vis 
traditional news media; and (4) conclude with a discussion of exemplification as a potential 
mechanism underlying perceived polarization.  
Political polarization 
Scholars have studied polarization in various forms. On the one hand, attitude 
polarization, an individual-level phenomenon, is said to occur when an individual’s attitude 
moves toward a more extreme position (e.g., Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). More often, however, 
polarization has been examined on a societal level, with scholars using different approaches and 
measurements to capture polarization (see Wojcieszak, 2015). For instance, some studies 
measure polarization as diverging preferences that cluster toward ideological poles, finding that 
mass polarization in US has not increased (Fiorina & Abrams, 2008; Abrams & Fiorina, 2012). 
Yet, research focusing on the growing overlap among issue preferences of supporters of the 
major political parties, has found evidence of polarization especially among the more partisan 
citizens (see Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008). Other scholars have expanded the focus of 
polarization from political issue positions toward affect (Iyengar et al., 2012), defining 
polarization, as “the extent to which partisans view each other as a disliked out-group” (Iyengar 
et al., 2012, p. 1). This work finds that such affective polarization has increased over the past 
several decades in US, with both Republicans and Democrats disliking their opponents more and 
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imputing negative traits to the out-party members (Iyengar et al., 2012). In sum, polarization has 
been understood on both individual and societal level and in both cognitive (issue polarization) 
and an affective (affective polarization) ways.  
Perceived polarization 
Complementing these conceptualizations of polarization, scholars have begun paying 
attention to the concept of perceived polarization. Hetherington and Roush (2013) have 
suggested redefining polarization as the extent to which an individual perceives differences 
between political opponents’ values and goals. In the same vein, Westfall et al. (2014) have 
conceptualized perceived polarization by measuring the difference between the respondents' 
estimate of Democrats' attitude and the estimated attitude of Republicans on a range of political 
issues. Other studies similarly captured the estimated difference between the positions of social 
groups (Ahler, 2014; Levendusky & Malhotra, 2015; Lupu, 2014). 
Here, we build on these ideas and conceptualize perceived polarization as one that can be 
examined alongside other conceptualizations, such as issue and affective polarization, and that 
occurs when individuals perceive political or social groups are separated, or far away, in their 
policy preferences. Thus, a person who thinks that political parties’ positions on issues are 
distant from each other perceives polarization, regardless of the actual level of disagreement or 
distance between the parties. We also argue that perceived polarization may occur not only when 
comparing “my” position or “my” group’s position to another, as is the case when left-leaning 
respondents are asked about their own party and the right-leaning party, but also when 
respondents compare multiple groups to which they may have no allegiance per se, but that are 
part of a political context. This, for instance, may be the case when independents perceive the 
parties to which they do not belong as being far away from each other on various policy stands. 
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In order to capture perceived polarization, we necessarily deviate from the traditional 
measures of issue polarization. Instead of focusing on mean group attitudes or bimodal 
distribution of public opinion, we focus on the absolute distance between political parties that 
people perceive. Following Hetherington and Roush (2013) and Levendusky and Malhotra 
(2015), we measure perceived polarization as party placement regarding some ideological or 
political issue. Yet, because we are dealing with countries that also have multiparty systems, we 
calculate the maximum perceived distance between any two parties as perceived political 
polarization (for a similar approach see Lupu, 2014). This operationalization has the additional 
advantage of letting us include people who do not identify with a party, but may nonetheless 
perceive polarization in their societies. 
The media environment 
Our primary focus is on the news media as one potential source of perceived polarization. 
After all, most political events and issues are only remotely experienced or not personally 
verifiable. It stands to reason, then, that the way in which the news media present these events 
and issues affects people’s perceptions of the political system, polarization included.  
In the context of polarization more broadly, scholars have focused on both traditional 
media, such as television or newspapers, and online media, such as websites or online social 
networks. When it comes to traditional media, the current media environment, with its channel 
proliferation and content diversification, allows unprecedented choice. This facilitates it for 
people to selectively expose themselves to like-minded outlets, such as various cable channels, 
partisan radio shows or ideological newspapers or magazines (Prior, 2007; Stroud, 2011), and 
also allows different sub-groups within society to customize their own news environments 
(Sunstein, 2007). These phenomena could lead to attitude polarization, by reinforcing individual 
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priors (Levendusky, 2009; Prior, 2013) as well as to societal polarization, moving partisan sub-
groups farther away from each other in their policy preferences (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008) 
and also increasing the hostility toward opposing partisans (Garrett et al., 2014). 
Our argument points in a slightly different direction. Certainly, media use may crystallize 
people’s attitudes, shape their issue positions and influence their affect. Furthermore, the media 
may also influence the judgments that people make about where those with differing views 
stand. Journalistic reports that are high in news value tend to emphasize conflicts and 
irreconcilable differences between political actors (Fiorina et al., 2005; Wilson, 2006). Also, 
media coverage often conveys complex political stories to the general public in a simplified way 
and presents policy debates among the elites as largely confrontational (Bennett, 1990). 
Furthermore, partisan media offer extreme and purposefully exaggerated exemplars of the other 
side, suggesting to people that their political opponents have radical views and extreme policy 
positions (Levendusky & Malhotra, 2015). As a result, exposure to news media could lead 
people to perceive the political system as polarized. In fact, some evidence suggests that this is 
the case. For example, Fiorina et al. (2005) have noted that the media covering the increased 
extremist rhetoric by party elites may have resulted in perceptions of polarization. Similarly, 
Levendusky and Malhotra (2015) have shown that exposure to press coverage of polarization 
leads people to see the general public as polarized. 
This theorizing and evidence mostly come from US and there are reasons to believe that 
traditional news media are differently related to polarization in different countries. For example, 
norms of civility likely differ across sociopolitical contexts and different media systems may 
promote differing reporting standards and journalistic functions under different funding 
constraints (e.g. public versus private media, Aalberg et al., 2013; Soroka et al., 2013). The oft-
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criticized contentious rhetoric in US media, the screaming heads, ferocious pundits and the “in 
your face” debates where participants are cast as enemies and routinely attack or denigrate each 
other (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Mutz, 2007), may be less (or yet more) prevalent in other 
media systems, thus leading to different effects on citizens’ perceptions. Thus, in order to offer a 
stringent test of whether traditional news media are related to perceived polarization it is 
necessary to adopt a comparative perspective. In this study, we test this relationship across 
various sociopolitical contexts. First, we focus on the associations between traditional media use 
and perceived polarization, asking: 
Research Question 1: Is traditional news use related to perceived political polarization? 
Research Question 2: Do relationships among traditional news use and perceived 
polarization differ by country?  
In addition, the online environment may exacerbate perceived polarization yet further 
(Sunstein, 2001). After all, the plethora of online forums, where different groups of people share 
different opinions about issues, means that internet users are embedded in numerous local online 
communities with sometimes divergent opinion climates (Nekmat & Gonzenbach, 2013). 
Inasmuch as these online communities make it easier for people to get news from attitudinally-
congruent sources, people may be exposed to consistent and potentially one-sided opinion 
climate (Wojcieszak, 2008). As a result, peoples’ perception of polarization might be amplified. 
In a related vein, the online environment may foster perceived polarization because when 
messages are discussed in an online network, the discussion is likely to be filtered by their social 
networks (Singer, 2014). For instance, partisan online users are not likely to email information, 
circulate a link, or post a Facebook update containing sensible arguments from an opposing 
political party. Rather, when sharing information about a disliked politician or group, those users 
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may disseminate information that mocks the opposing side, portraying them as absurd, stupid, 
and extreme. Thus, online news use may amplify perceived polarization by making extreme 
examples of the other side easily available. 
Here, we propose that exemplification may be one of the potential mechanisms that 
explain why media use may be related to perceived polarization. The exemplification process 
suggests that exemplars in news stories, such as biased partisan exemplars emphasized in 
attitudinally-congruent sources and circulated by like-minded online social networks–become 
anchor points for individual opinions about a population of occurrences (Zillmann, 1999). As a 
result, when forming judgments or making decisions, people tend to rely on those easily 
available examples (Zilllmann, 1999). Moreover, consistent with the availability heuristic 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), exemplars most frequently presented in the media are more easily 
accessible to people, particularly when there is little direct experience with the events being 
considered (Busselle & Shrum, 2003). When it comes to perceived polarization, Fiorina et al. 
(2005) note:   
In all likelihood readers remember vivid contrasts like these-however extreme and 
unrepresentative-much longer than small differences in nationally representative 
polls… In sum, rather than draw the conclusion that America has split into two 
distinct camps from a systematic look at a broad array of data, the media often 
reverse the process, selecting unusual but colorful examples to fit the prior 
conclusion that the country is deeply split. (p.24)  
 
Thus, when citizens are asked about their own positions on political issues they might be 
able to provide a response that reflects what they think. However, when asked about the 
positions of others, it is the available exemplars that may influence their judgments. Furthermore, 
people exaggerate the dissimilarity of information that differs from their own attitude and 
minimize the dissimilarity of information that is close to own position (Hovland & Sherif, 1952). 
Therefore, it seems plausible that people exposed to extreme exemplars of politicians from an 
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opposing political party may conclude that a group from which those exemplars are drawn is 
more extreme than it really is. This misperception would result in perceived polarization. 
Furthermore, as aforementioned, considering that the online environment amplifies the potential 
for exposure to extreme exemplars, and that such exposure is more contingent on social networks 
and less on formal attributes of a media system, we advance the following hypothesis:   
   Hypothesis 1. Online news use will be positively related to perceived political polarization.  
To examine these questions and our hypothesis, we rely on a comparative design in ten 
countries that differ in their political and media systems. This comparative design allows us to 
capture contextual national differences in the patterns tested. When comparing the relationships 
between perceived polarization and different news sources, the finding from one country may not 
generalize to another sociopolitical context. After all, each media system has a unique 
relationship with the political system and thus the same media platform can play a different role 
in informing the citizens in different countries (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Tiffen et al., 2013). For 
this reason, a comparative approach is advantageous over studies that focus on a single country. 
If we find a consistent pattern in the relationship between media use and perceived polarization 
across different countries, it may suggest that we are capturing a robust association rather than a 
national peculiarity. Specifically, we expect that the relationship between perceived polarization 
and online news use will be stronger and more consistent across countries than the relationships 
between perceived polarization and traditional media use. This is because, unlike traditional 
media, the Internet is less subject to different press-party relationships and more free from 
traditional social structural pressures (Reese, 2001). 
Methods 
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Data1 
 This study analyzed cross-national survey data from Canada, Colombia, Greece, India, 
Italy, Japan, Norway, South Korea, UK and US. These countries were selected based on the 
variation of key attributes of the media and political systems.2 With regard to the media system, 
following Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) typology, Canada, UK, and US are considered as 
representatives the “Liberal” model, Greece and Italy of the “Polarized Pluralist” model, and 
Norway of the “Democratic Corporist” model. Colombia, India, Japan, and South Korea are 
countries that allow us to go beyond the Hallin and Mancini’s (20014) typology, including 
further cultural and development differences. 
The surveys were administered to nationally representative samples in the ten countries 
between June and August 2010. In eight countries, the survey was administered online, and in 
Greece and Colombia the interviews were conducted by telephone and face-to-face, respectively. 
In the case of online surveys, YouGov-PMX or its local affiliates used a matching procedure to 
deliver the equivalent of a conventional probability sample on the basis of specified demographic 
attributes from pre-established panels. In general, the sampling process has two stages. First, 
YouGov recruits a large panel of Internet users who have agreed to participate in online surveys. 
Because this panel is itself not representative of the population YouGov draws a sub-sample 
from the panel and matches it on a range of socio-demographic to a random sample of 
respondents drawn from the census data. To further ensure representativeness of the sample, we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This study was supported by the Australian Research Council (Australia), Social Science and Humanities Council 
of Canada (Canada), University of Wisconsin-Madison (Colombia), Greek Ministry of Information, National 
& Kapodistrian University of Athens (Greece), University of Hydrabad/MICORE (India), Sky Italia (Italy), the 
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (Japan), Research Council of Norway (Norway), Korean Research 
Foundation (South Korea), Economic and Social Research Council (UK), and Korean Science Foundation (US).	  
2 Specifically, while the participating countries have democratic political structures, they differ in the strength of 
public service broadcasting; the scope of regulations imposed on commercial news providers, the extent to which 
news sources are affiliated with political parties or social movements; the party system itself (whether two- or multi-
party); the elite political culture, partisan or consensual; and the level of economic development (see Curran et al., 
2014; Soroka et al., 2013). 
PERCEIVED POLITICAL POLARIZATION      13 
statistically weigh the final data to the national profile of all adults aged over 18. As such, the 
resulting sample is equivalent to a conventional probability sample. The samples were directly 
drawn on YouGov panels. In some countries, YouGov applied their sampling techniques to 
panels maintained by Research Now (Canada, Norway, and Japan), Zapera (Norway), and 
Nielsen KoreanClick (South Korea). In India, the sample was limited to residents in urban areas 
and participants were recruited from an online panel maintained by USamp. 
In Greece, the survey was conducted by the research company Public Issue, which 
conducted telephone interviews with respondents at their home using a multistage stratified 
random sample of the general population aged 18 years or older. The sample is representative of 
the Greek population, including the Aegean and Ionian Islands. In Colombia, the survey was 
conducted in 10 cities by a local polling firm, Deproyectos Limitada. The survey was 
administered face-to-face with respondents who were selected using a multistage stratified 
random sampling based on census data, and the final sample represents Colombia's adult urban 
population— about 76% of Colombia’s 44.5 million inhabitants.  
Measures 
Perceived polarization. Perceived polarization was operationalized as the absolute 
distance between the two most distant political parties’ positions on specific sociopolitical issues 
as placed by the respondent. On 7-point Likert-type scales, respondents were asked to locate 
major political parties on three important issues for each country (see Hetherington & Roush, 
2013 for a similar strategy). In each country, researchers selected issues that were politically 
controversial at the moment. Although the issues were not identical across the countries, all of 
the selected issues tapped the classic left-right dimensions concerning the provision of social 
welfare benefits and government regulation of business, as well as emerging issues ranging from 
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immigration, civic rights of cultural minorities, environmental protection to relations with 
neighboring states (see Table 1 for the complete list of issues). 
In short, perceived polarization score is calculated as 
Perceived polarization = |X1-X2| 
where X1 and X2 are the two most extreme scores in the scale.3 The perceived polarization scores 
are calculated for each issue and then averaged because the scores of the three issues in each 
country were highly consistent. The perceived polarization score ranges from 0 to 6, where a 
higher score indicates higher levels of perceived polarization (descriptive statistics in Table 1). 
News consumption. Newspaper, radio news, and television news use were measured by 
asking respondents how often in a typical week they used news on a particular medium (from 1 
“every day” to 5 “hardly ever”).4 Internet news use was measured on the same scale by asking 
respondents how often they visited an online news website in a typical week. These items were 
recoded so that a higher value points to a more frequent use. 
Attitude Extremity. We asked respondents’ own attitudes on three sociopolitical issues for 
each country using a 7-point Likert-type scale with the opposing ends of the scale representing 
the opposing views. The issues asked are the same ones we asked for measuring perceived 
polarization. Then we constructed an attitude extremity variable by computing the absolute 
deviation from the scale midpoint. Three attitude extremity scores were averaged to create a 
single measure for each country (from 0 “moderate” to 3 “extreme”). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Measuring perceived issue positions of two most distant parties of the countries with multi-party system may 
overestimate the perceived polarization because participants could think of two extreme fringe parties when they 
gave an answer. However, we did not include those ‘fringe' parties in the surveys. Second, we also tested the same 
relationship using an alternative measure. Instead of simply calculating the distance between two most extreme 
parties, Lupu (2014) delineated a strategy for measuring individuals’ perceptions of polarization by using a weighted 
sum of the distances between the parties coupled with the relative weight capturing the power that each party exerts 
in the system. The result using this alternative measure is discussed in Result section.	  4	  Radio news use in Colombia was assessed on a 6-point scale (0 “frequently” to 5 “never”).	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Demographics. We measured age, gender, education level, and household income to 
control for their potential effects on perceived polarization. Age and gender were measured by 
directly asking the year of birth and biological sex. Education and household income were 
measured with ordered scales sensitive to local variation. 
Results 
We first explored perceived polarization across the ten countries. Among the ten 
countries, Greece, Italy, Norway, and South Korea are the countries with the highest perceived 
polarization levels; India, UK, and US are moderate; and Canada and Colombia are the countries 
where the public perceives little polarization among political parties (see Table 1). 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Towards addressing our research questions and hypothesis, we examined the 
relationships between perceived polarization and a series of news consumption variables: 
traditional news media use and Internet news use. Our analytical strategy is straightforward. We 
tested a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models predicting perceived 
polarization controlling for age, gender, income, and education level. In addition, we controlled 
for respondents’ attitude extremity regarding the issues tested, considered as a way of controlling 
for the effects of actual, individual-level attitude polarization on perceived polarization. 
Our first research question asked whether traditional news media use is related to 
perceived polarization. The results suggest that at least one type of traditional news media use 
predicts perceived polarization in four out of the ten countries. However, there are substantial 
variations in the relationships between traditional media use and perceived polarization, in that a 
specific medium in a specific country can contribute to perceived polarization. This addresses 
our second research question, as to whether the relationships among traditional news use and 
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perceived polarization differ by country. That is, it is not the case that various sources are 
consistently associated with perceived polarization in one country, or that the same source is 
similarly related to perceived polarization across countries. Rather, the detected patterns are both 
context and medium specific (see Table 2). For example, with regard to newspaper use, we find 
that only in Norway frequent newspaper readers perceive higher polarization (β =.10; p < .05). 
However, in the other nine countries there is no association between newspaper readership and 
perceived polarization. 
With respect to television news, our results are more complex. In three countries, 
television news viewing and perceived polarization are significantly related, yet this relationship 
is positive in two countries and negative in one country. As shown in Table 2, in Greece (β = .09; 
p < .05) and Italy (β = .09; p < .01), those citizens who frequently watch television news also see 
political parties as polarized; however, in Japan, (β = -.16; p < .001) those who often tune in to 
television perceive less polarization. 
For radio news, significant relationships are found in two countries, and the pattern is 
consistent. In Japan (β = -.13; p < .001) and South Korea (β = -.10; p < .001), those who often 
tune to radio news perceive less polarization than infrequent listeners. In the remaining seven 
countries, radio news use is not related to individual perception as to whether political parties are 
polarized. All in all, although the results do not reveal a consistent pattern regarding traditional 
media use, there are several country specific influences, which we discuss in the next section. 
Now we turn our attention to Internet news. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Parallel analyses tested Hypothesis 1, namely that there is a positive relationship between 
perceived polarization and online news consumption. The models find a straightforward and 
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consistent pattern. In nine out of the ten countries considered, there is a positive relationship 
between online news use and perceived polarization; India being the only exception with a weak 
negative relationship. The associations between online news consumption and perceived 
polarization are not only consistent across countries but also stronger than those of traditional 
news consumption. Overall, the results support our expectation that people who acquire their 
news online tend to perceive a more polarized polity.5 
We additionally find that attitude extremity (our operationalization of attitude 
polarization) is positively associated with perceived polarization in all nine countries we tested.6 
This suggests that people who have extreme issue positions also perceive more polarization 
among the parties (Van Boven, Judd, & Sherman, 2012). 
To ensure that attitude polarization and perceived polarization are distinctive concepts, 
we additionally examined the effects of online news use on attitude extremity after controlling 
for the same variables that we used in the regression models presented in Table 2. In contrast to 
the consistent relationship between online news use and perceived polarization, we did not find 
significant relationships between online news use and attitude polarization except for Canada (β 
= .13, p < .01) and South Korea (β = .17, p < .001). This finding bolsters our argument that 
online news affects perceptions of polarization but not actual attitude polarization. 
Discussion 
In this study, we explored perceived polarization in a comparative perspective and tested 
the associations between media use and perceived polarization. When considering different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Because our perceived polarization measure may exaggerate the perceived distance among parties in multi-party 
system, we tested the same OLS regression models a using weighted measure of perceived polarization, suggested 
by Lupu (2014). These additional tests show that the size and the statistical significance of the standardized 
regression coefficients of Online News Use in the seven countries of multi-party system are very consistent with 
those of the original analyses: Canada (β = .15, p < .01), Colombia (β = .10, p < .05), Greece (β = .13, p < .001), 
India (β = -.09, p < .05), Italy (β = .19, p < .001), Norway (β = .09, p < .05), U.K. (β = .14, p < .001). 
6 We tested this relationship only in nine countries because Italy did not have the attitude extremity measure. 
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media outlets, we find no clear pattern between traditional news consumption and seeing the 
political system as polarized. Using the Hallin and Mancini’s (2004; 2012) typology to interpret 
our results offers important insights. In countries belonging to the “Liberal” model, such as 
Canada, UK, and US, traditional media are mostly unrelated to perceived polarization. It could 
be the case that neutrality, theoretically characteristic of this model, may shield citizens in those 
countries from perceiving their political system as polarized. This tentative explanation, 
however, stands in large contrast to the aforementioned evidence from US, which suggests that 
the largely commercial partisan media may exacerbate polarization when it comes to attitudes, 
issues and policy preferences, affect as well as perceptions (Levendusky & Malhotra, 2015).. On 
the other hand, in countries such as Greece and Italy, which are part of the “Polarized Pluralist” 
model in which partisan media alignment is common, traditional media tend to foster perceived 
polarization. And finally, in the “Democratic Corporatist” system, as in Norway, we find a 
positive relation only with newspaper use, which might be tied to the historical party press 
alignment characteristics of this media system. It needs to be kept in mind, however, that Hallin 
and Mancini typology is continually evolving, as many countries converge on a market-driven 
journalism, characteristic of the Liberal model, while at the same time some countries shift 
toward increased political parallelism. When we examine the countries in our sample outside the 
original typology, the relationships are less clear and can only be described as country dependent. 
In stark contrast to the weak relationships between traditional media use and perceived 
polarization, we find clear and stronger positive associations between online news use and 
perceived polarization in a solid majority of the countries analyzed. This indicates that using the 
Internet for news information is likely to lead an individual to perceive political actors as distant 
from one another on some crucial policy stands. This consistent pattern indicating the influences 
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of the online media environment on perceived polarization transcend the specific media systems 
of the different countries is the central contribution of our study. 
Another noteworthy finding regards the rather inconsistent relationship between online 
news consumption and actual attitude polarization. Although perceived polarization and attitude 
polarization are related in that people with extreme attitudes are known to perceive more 
polarization (Van Boven et al., 2012), the fact that online news use only contributes to perceived 
polarization suggests that perceived and actual attitude polarization are distinct concepts. 
Earlier we suggested that exposure to extreme exemplars is one potential mechanism by 
which online news could contribute to perceived polarization. As the Internet and online social 
networks increasingly become news sources for many citizens (Milosevic et al., 2014), people 
are faced with information environment in which examples of extreme positions of the other side 
abound. One of the consequences may well be that people start to perceive more polarization 
simply due to the biased examples that they encounter in the media.  
To test this notion, we conducted a follow-up experiment. For this experiment we asked 
78 students from a large Midwestern university if they thought health insurance plans should 
cover contraceptive for women free of charge. This question related to a bill in US that called for 
mandating coverage of contraceptives as part of the Affordable Care Act. We then randomly 
assigned the participants to one of two experimental conditions: exposure to an extreme versus a 
mild exemplar in news content covering the controversy that ensued over the proposed 
legislation. Subjects viewed a news article on an online website mimicking MSNBC, a liberal-
leaning cable news outlet. The stimulus articles described a controversy around the bill and 
provisions mandating coverage of contraceptives. Depending on the condition, the article 
included a different version of a video report embedded in the text. In one condition, subjects 
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watched a moderate conservative political commentator, Joe Scarborough, discussing the issue. 
In the other condition, subjects saw Rush Limbaugh, a more extreme conservative media figure. 
After reading and watching the stimulus material, subjects evaluated where the Republican and 
Democratic parties stood on this issue and indicated their own opinion once again. To assess 
perceived polarization, we employed the same measurement strategy as outlined above. 
The results are telling. The significant main effect of subjects’ preexisting attitude (F (1, 
74) = 6.64, p < .05) indicates that those who were initially favorable toward the bill—that is, 
those who tend to be more liberal—perceived more political polarization (M = 4.49, S.D. = 1.01) 
than those who had an unfavorable attitude at the beginning (M = 3.91, S.D. = 1.04). There was 
no significant main effect of the news exemplar on perceived polarization. However, and most 
germane to our argument, we found a significant interaction between the preexisting attitude and 
the news exemplar provided (F (1, 74) = 5.51, p < .05). Perceived polarization among the 
subjects who were initially favorable toward the bill and watched the extreme exemplar was 
higher than among the subjects who were initially favorable toward the bill and watched the less 
extreme exemplar (t (74) = -2.01, p < .05), and than among the subjects who had a negative 
attitude toward the bill (the more conservative position) and were exposed to the more extreme 
exemplar (t (74) = -3.36, p < .01). This consistent pattern shows that partisans, in this case liberal 
participants who supported the bill, perceived more polarization among political parties when 
exposed to an extreme exemplar from the other side of the political spectrum. These findings 
support the notion that biased exemplification can be a mechanism of the perceived polarization. 
In this study, we tested our expectations in multiple sociopolitical contexts, offering rich 
comparative evidence on perceived polarization and its communicative correlates. It needs to be 
kept in mind that our study relies on cross-sectional data and, as such, we cannot speak to the 
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causal effects from media exposure to individual perceptions. Also, we cannot test the causal 
relationship between attitude extremity and perceived polarization, nor the effects of perceived 
polarization. We suspect that people with more extreme attitudes may perceive more polarization 
over time as a result of their online news consumption. This may lead those people to further use 
new media to express their views and persuade others (Rojas, 2010). If people with extreme 
attitudes who perceive more polarization are disproportionally vocal, active, and exert influence 
on the political process, compromise and consensus may become harder to achieve. Longitudinal 
studies are needed to examine these notions.  
In addition, the variance that our statistical models explained varies across countries and 
is modest in some countries. We conjecture there might be other factors that contribute to 
perceived polarization, ranging from macro level factors, such as political culture and the nature 
of political coverage in the media, to individual level factors, such as political socialization and 
psychological traits. Future research that considers a wider range of variables might be able to 
better explain perceived polarization and its antecedents. 
Also, although our post-hoc experiment suggests that being exposed to extreme 
exemplars is a driving force behind perceived polarization, we have no evidence that subjects in 
our main study were in fact exposed to more extreme exemplars. Future research that employs 
longitudinal designs combined with thorough content analysis would be better suited to speak to 
the underlying mechanisms implicit in our work. 
Another limitation of our study is that we relied on self-reported measures of media use. 
Such measures are known to overestimate media consumption, with different people 
overestimating at different rates (Prior, 2009). The reliance on self-reports remains a perennial 
problem in survey research in communication science, and there is little consensus as to how to 
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best measure media use in questionnaires (see Dilliplane, Goldman, Mutz, 2012; Prior, 2009). 
Nevertheless, there are no reasons to suspect that overestimation changes across medium, in that 
respondents differently overestimate their use of, lets say, television and newspapers. As such, 
our results are not likely to be affected by biases that might come from self-reported measures. 
Lastly, it needs to be noted that our study did not include measures tapping cable news 
use more specifically. In US, many cable news channels are strongly partisan and expose the 
audiences, who tend to be strongly partisan themselves, to biased and extreme exemplars of the 
other side (Prior, 2007). This may lead the viewers to perceive polarization in the political 
system and, as a result, partisan cable news may have similar effects on perceived polarization as 
the online environment. Unfortunately, due to the lack of pertinent measures, we could not 
compare online news use, network television news use, and cable news use; and we could not 
determine whether their associations with perceived polarization differ. It is an important 
challenge for future research to disentangle the differential effects from a variety of fragmented 
news sources in the current media environment, and do so in a comparative perspective.  
Despite these limitations our results are compelling and point to several important 
contributions. The differences found in how traditional media and online media relate to 
perceived polarization and attitude extremity support our view that it is important to incorporate 
perceived polarization into ongoing discussions about political polarization in its other forms. It 
is plausible that affective polarization, or interparty hostility is fostered by selective exposure to 
like-minded media content (Garrett et al., 2014) that uses extreme exemplars to illustrate the 
opposition. It is also possible that perceived polarization mediates attitude polarization, in that 
seeing the political system as polarized may cause people to become more extreme and more 
polarized themselves (Ahler, 2014) as well as affective polarization, in that exposure to extreme 
PERCEIVED POLITICAL POLARIZATION      23 
exemplars from the other side makes one thinks that the political opponents are extreme, which 
in turn may lead people to dislike them (Levendusky & Malhotra, 2015).  
This study also offers some methodological advancement to the polarization literature. 
Although we recognize that the field has been saturated with various definitions and 
measurements, perceived polarization may be a useful addition to existing measures. Only by 
capturing the multiple contours of polarization, including issue positions, affect for those who 
think differently, and perceptions about where the others stand on issues, we will be able to 
advance the scholarship in this area. In addition, the operationalization for measuring perceived 
polarization proposed here can be applied to multiple social groups and organizations, above and 
beyond partisans or political parties. Although previous operationalizations have relied on party 
identification to measure issue stances or affective distance toward others, we posit that, for 
someone to perceive polarization, they do not need to be partisan themselves. On the contrary, 
independents may perceive polarization which may affect their political attitudes or behaviors. 
On a final note, we encourage future research in the area to examine the longer-term 
societal consequences of individual perceptions that a given party system is polarized. We are 
convinced that perceived polarization may have important effects on citizens’ decisions as to 
whether or not to express their own opinion or engage in the political system. For example, 
people who perceive the political system as polarized may dismiss the proposals of the opposing 
party as extreme and incompatible; thus being less favorable toward engaging in deliberation to 
find a common ground. It is also plausible that, whereas for the more partisan and the more 
strongly opinionated citizens a perception that political parties are in strong opposition may spur 
expression and engagement (Rojas, 2010; Van Boven et al., 2012; Westfall et al., 2014), for 
those with weaker partisan allegiances the effect may be the opposite: disengagement and 
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dissatisfaction with the political system (e.g., Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002). Thus, although 
polarization may help mobilize voting and political engagement for some, it might be a 
demobilizing force for others. This poses an important normative question for future theorizing 
and research: Is political polarization a “bad thing” or, could it be that certain levels of 
polarization are needed for the functioning of a democratic political system? 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Perceived Polarization Variables 
Country Issue Cronbach’s α 
Canada  Bank regulation Energy Public healthcare  
M (SD) 
N 
2.13 (1.67) 
762 
2.18 (1.83) 
800 
2.31 (1.85) 
764 
.81 
Colombia  FTA Gay marriage Solutions for 
guerrilla issue 
 
M (SD) 
N 
2.35 (2.35) 
832 
1.37 (1.93) 
721 
2.70 (2.35) 
908 
.51 
Greece  Austerity measures Separation 
between church 
and state 
Immigration 
regulation 
 
M (SD) 
N 
4.64 (1.84) 
983 
4.57 (1.99) 
945 
4.17 (2.01) 
967 
.61 
India  Economic zones Entry of foreign 
educational 
institutions 
Formation of small 
parties 
 
M (SD) 
N 
2.99 (1.68) 
964 
2.81 (1.81) 
943 
2.55 (1.68) 
936 
.71 
Italy  Spending cuts Building nuclear 
plants 
Immigration limits  
M (SD) 
N 
3.87 (2.06) 
973 
4.04 (2.16) 
964 
4.14 (1.84) 
977 
.83 
Japan  Revising 
constitution 
- -  
M (SD) 
N 
1.49 (1.55) 
783 
- - - 
Norway  Bank regulation Environment Healthcare  
M (SD) 
N 
4.18 (1.74) 
787 
3.72 (1.63) 
850 
4.44 (1.74) 
866 
.79 
South Korea  Privatizing 
healthcare 
Building 
relationships with 
North Korea 
Four-river 
development 
project 
 
M (SD) 
N 
3.68 (1.93) 
1000 
3.82 (1.81) 
1000 
5.09 (1.55) 
1000 
.77 
United 
Kingdom 
 Bank regulation Spending cuts Immigration limits  
M (SD) 
N 
2.10 (1.63) 
836 
3.54 (1.82) 
928 
2.87 (1.71) 
915 
.75 
United 
States 
 Bank regulation Environment Health care  
M (SD) 
N 
3.33 (1.95) 
886 
2.91 (1.83) 
898 
3.71 (2.02) 
918 
.79 
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17.48 (8.37) 
 
-6.99 (7.00) 
 
5.89 (7.61)  
 
-6.74 (7.30) 
 
B
irth Y
ear 
  -.01 (.00) 
-.12
** 
  -.01 (.00) 
 -.08
* 
   .00 (.00) 
.04 
  .00 (.00)  -.02 
   .00 (.00) 
.04 
Fem
ale 
   -.10 (.13) 
-.04 
   .14 (.11) 
 .05 
   .01 (.08) 
 .00 
 -.10 (.10)   -.04 
  -.34 (.11) 
 -.11
** 
Education 
   .05 (.05) 
 .03 
   .21 (.04) 
 .24
*** 
  -.09 (.05) 
-.05 
  .03 (.01)   .10
* 
   .18 (.04) 
 .16
*** 
Incom
e 
  -.03 (.02) 
-.08 
   .05 (.02) 
.10
* 
   .11 (.02) 
 .14
*** 
  .04 (.02)  .07 
   .06 (.02) 
 .14
*** 
A
ttitude Extrem
ity 
   .24 (.06) 
.16
*** 
   .31 (.07) 
.17
*** 
   .68 (.04) 
.40
*** 
  .45 (.07)  
.25
*** 
   .51 (.07) 
.25
*** 
N
ew
spaper 
  .00 (.04) 
.01 
   .11 (.05) 
 .10
* 
  -.01 (.02) 
-.01 
 -.01 (.03)  -.02 
  -.02 (.03) 
 -.02 
TV
 N
ew
s 
  -.21 (.06) 
-.16
*** 
  .01 (.05) 
.01 
   .02 (.03) 
 .02 
 .01 (.04)   -.01 
   .02 (.04) 
 .02 
R
adio N
ew
s 
  -.14 (.04) 
-.13
*** 
   .02 (.04) 
 .02 
  -.10 (.03) 
-.10
*** 
  .05 (.03)   .06 
   .02 (.03) 
 .02 
O
nline N
ew
s 
   .18 (.04) 
 .19
*** 
   .10 (.04) 
 .09
* 
   .06 (.03) 
 .06
* 
  .11 (.03)   .14
*** 
   .15 (.04) 
 .15
*** 
R
2 (Adj-R
2) 
.10 (.08) 
.11 (.10) 
.21 (.21) 
.10 (.10) 
.19 (.18) 
N
ote 1. *p <
 .05, **p <
 .01, ***p <
 .001. 
	  
